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Programs
David G. King*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

Just before Christopher Van Duyn entered middle school, his teachers, school
district representatives, and mother agreed to an extensive plan for his following year’s
education.1 The plan was very detailed: It laid out how many hours per week and what
days he would work on specific subjects, provided him with a full-time behavior
management plan, required him to be placed in a self-contained classroom and to
regularly see a specialist, and described how his progress was to be evaluated.2
Christopher was entitled to this Individualized Education Program (IEP) because his
severe autism qualified him for special education and related services under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act).3
Soon after the new school year began, a dispute arose when Christopher’s parents
suspected that the school district was not fulfilling the requirements of his newly created
IEP.4 Specifically, his parents alleged that Christopher was not getting enough hours of
math instruction, that his behavioral management plan was different from that which was
agreed-upon, that some of his assignments were not on his educational level, and that he
was not being educated in a self-contained classroom.5 His parents sued the school
district for failing to implement Christopher’s IEP, and his case eventually reached the
United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.6 A divided court, adopting a rule similar to
that applied in two other circuits, held that a school district violates the IDEA for failing
to implement an IEP only if the failure to implement is “material.”7 Thus, despite the fact
that Christopher’s school did not provide him with all the provisions agreed upon in his
*

Juris Doctor, 2009, Northwestern University School of Law; Bachelor of Arts, 2003, University of
Michigan. Special thanks go to Wally Winter of the Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago
for his initial assistance in developing this Note and to Mark Weber of DePaul University College of Law
for both introducing me to Special Education Law and for his insightful comments on previous drafts.
1
Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2007).
2
Id. at 815–16.
3
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (1997). In 2004, Congress reauthorized the Act with the “Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act.” See Pub L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004). Because this
case began before the reauthorization, the new Act does not apply. However, the implications of the new
Act are discussed at infra note 28.
4
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 816.
5
Id. at 816, 823–25.
6
Id. at 817.
7
Id. at 822.
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IEP, the school district was only liable for its failure to provide him with enough hours of
math instruction because the other failures were not “material.”8
This newly created materiality standard will have an important effect upon
subsequent courts in their evaluation of whether school districts meet IDEA obligations
despite failing to implement some or all of the provisions of a student’s IEP. Part II of
this Note provides an overview of the statutory right of a disabled student to a “Free
Appropriate Public Education” (FAPE),9 details how courts have interpreted this right,
and discusses the different standards used by courts to evaluate alleged implementation
failures. Part III analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v.
Baker School District 5J, and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of both the majority
and dissenting opinions. Part IV discusses the vast implications of this case, raising the
issues of whether the Van Duyn majority applied the Act and case law correctly, whether
the materiality standard is appropriate for the judiciary, and how the case will affect the
creation and implementation of future IEPs. Part V concludes that the decision is legally
correct and represents a step in the right direction for courts, schools, and most
importantly, students with disabilities.
II. OVERVIEW OF SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW
A. The Right to a “Free Appropriate Public Education”

¶4

¶5

Although federal subsidies in the 1960s10 and two favorable court decisions in the
1970s helped some students with disabilities gain access to education, the major
breakthrough did not occur until the passage of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA).12 Congress, mindful of the need to continue the
progress of educational reform that had become a national focus in the Civil Rights Era,
was particularly concerned that millions of disabled students were receiving either an
inappropriate education or no education at all due to their disabilities.13 More
specifically, Congress found that 2.2 million students were receiving an inappropriate
education and 1.75 million students were receiving no education at all.14 The EAHCA
sought to correct this problem by requiring all schools receiving federal funding to
provide FAPE to all disabled students “regardless of the severity of their handicap.”15
The EAHCA framework for providing a student with FAPE still exists today
(renamed now as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act). The Act16 first directs
11

8

Id. at 823–25.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
10
See Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
11
See Mills. v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Penn. Ass’n for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
12
Pub. L. No. 94-142 (1975).
13
20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (1976) (stating that Congress was concerned with providing money to “handicapped
children who are not receiving an education” and to the several “handicapped children . . . with the most
severe handicaps who are receiving an inadequate education”).
14
S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1432; H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at
11–12 (1975).
15
Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 612(2)(C) (1975).
16
To avoid confusion, the term Act refers to the EAHCA and its progeny.
9
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school districts to identify students with disabilities.17 It further creates several
procedures designed to increase parental participation in order to further one of the Act’s
central provisions—the IEP. An IEP is a written statement detailing an educational plan
tailored to the student’s unique learning needs and is developed by a multi-disciplinary
team consisting of teachers, educational administrators, and parents.18 The statement
includes, among other things, a report of the child’s present academic achievement and
functional performance, measurable annual goals, a metric for measuring the child’s
progress towards these goals, and a list of the special education and related services
needed to advance these goals.19 Congress concluded that such a written educational plan
“would require school systems to develop an expertise and ability to provide services
guaranteed to assure educational process.”20
Providing a written IEP was especially important to the overall goal of increasing
parental participation—one of Congress’ chief goals in creating the IEP:
Thus, it is the intent of this provision that local educational agencies
involve the parent at the beginning of and at other times during the year
regarding the provision of specific services and short-term instructional
objectives for the special education of the handicapped child, which
services are specifically designed to meet the child's individual needs and
problems. The Committee views this process as a method of involving the
parent and the handicapped child in the provision of appropriate services,
providing parent counseling as to ways to bolster the educational process
at home, and providing parent with a written statement of what the school
intends to do for the handicapped child.21

¶7

Put another way, written IEPs “are a way to provide parent involvement and protection to
assure that appropriate services are provided to the handicapped child.”22
Of course, the importance of parental involvement does not disappear at the IEP’s
creation. For example, the Act requires prior written notice to parents whenever the
school either proposes or refuses to initiate or change the “identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education
to the child.”23 Parents also have the opportunity to inspect records relating to their child
and to “obtain an independent educational evaluation of the child.”24 Most importantly,
the Act enables parents to challenge proposed initiations or changes through a “Due
Process Complaint Notice.”25 After filing such a notice, parents are entitled to an
“impartial due process hearing,”26 and then the Act permits any aggrieved party to file a

17

20 U.S.C. § 1412(3).
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
19
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A).
20
S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 11 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1435.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 12.
23
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3).
24
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1).
25
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(a); 1415(c)(2).
26
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).
18
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civil action in either state or federal court.27 Therefore, the detailed provisions of the Act
provide significant rights to parents and students with disabilities, as well as places
several affirmative obligations upon school districts.
Central to both these rights and obligations is the requirement that states provide
eligible students with FAPE. While the Act has significantly changed since 1975,28 the
statutory definition of a “Free Appropriate Public Education” has not.29 The current
definition is:
The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and
related services that—
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge;
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary
school education in the State involved; and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program
required under section 1414(d) of this title.30
However detailed the rights and obligations of the Act, the ambiguity of this statutory
definition, combined with the fact that Congress has never clarified the definition in the
Act’s subsequent reauthorizations, has meant that the courts have had to interpret its
meaning and requirements by relying upon other provisions of the Act.

27

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
Congress reauthorized the EACHA in 1990 and changed the title to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (1990). Although the reauthorization made some changes, the
most significant change was the change in terminology “in recognition of the changing dynamics of special
education and the emergence of ‘people-first’ terminology.” Wendy F. Hensel, Sharing the Short Bus:
Eligibility and Identity under the IDEA, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1147, 1156 (2007). Unlike the 1990
reauthorization, the 1997 amendments substantially changed the IDEA. Most importantly, Congress
shifted the focus of the Act from ensuring that all disabled students had access to FAPE to attempting to
improve the education that the disabled students receive. In accomplishing this shift, Congress increased
substantive and procedural requirements for IEPs, as well as redefined school discipline and accountability.
Tara L. Eyer, Comment, Greater Expectations: How the 1997 IDEA Amendments Raise the Basic Floor of
Opportunity for Children with Disabilities, 103 DICK. L. REV. 613, 628–30 (1998). In 2004, Congress
reauthorized the Act with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA). Again,
this reauthorization did not fundamentally change the structure of the Act. The IDEIA’s new provisions
linked the Act with No Child Left Behind, changed the eligibility requirements for learning-disabled
students, and changed dispute resolution procedures and disciplinary procedures. See generally Mark C.
Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7
(2006) (reviewing the IDEIA’s changes).
29
See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1990); 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1997); 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (2000); 20 U.S.C. §
1401(9) (2004).
30
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2004).
28
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B. How Courts Have Interpreted FAPE
1. The Rowley Standard

¶9

The Supreme Court first interpreted the FAPE requirement in Board of Education
of Hendrick Hudson Central School District of Westchester County v. Rowley.31 In what
is commonly referred to as the Rowley two-prong test, the Supreme Court found that a
school district satisfies the IDEA’s requirement to provide all qualifying students with
FAPE when (a) the school meets the procedural requirements imposed on the school by
the Act, and (b) when the student’s IEP is substantively valid.32
¶10
In regards to the procedural requirement,33 the Court emphasized the importance of
parental “participation at every stage of the administrative process,”34 and even stated
that “adequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure
much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.”35
But the Court’s seemingly large emphasis on the importance of procedural rights did not
translate over to the evaluation of the substantive validity of a student’s IEP.36 More
specifically, the Court’s decision turned on what the undefined “appropriate” meant
under the Act. The Court reasoned that since the intent of the Act was to guarantee
educational access and not to maximize a student’s potential, a student’s IEP is
“appropriate” when it is “reasonably calculated to enable the [student] to receive
educational benefits.”37 Furthermore, the Court stated that the Act established a “basic
floor of opportunity” for a student and does not guarantee a specific substantive level of
educational achievement to be provided through special education and related services.38
This minimal educational standard39 is often referred to as entitling students with
disabilities to a “serviceable Chevrolet as opposed to a luxury Cadillac.”40
2. Interpretation of Rowley
¶11

It has been over twenty-five years since the Rowley decision and it is still as
controversial as when it was first decided. In addition to its contentious minimal
educational standard, there is confusion among the circuits and commentators as to
Rowley’s application. For example, there is a circuit split regarding what constitutes the
“educational benefit” portion of Rowley’s FAPE definition.41 Six circuits require the
31

458 U.S. 176 (1982).
Id. at 206–07.
33
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (outlining the procedural safeguards available to children and their families under
the FAPE provision).
34
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205.
35
Id. at 206.
36
Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. of Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189
(1982).
37
Id. at 207.
38
Id. at 201, 201 n.23.
39
See Lester Aron, Too Much or Not Enough: How Have the Circuit Courts Defined a Free Appropriate
Public Education After Rowley?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2005).
40
Scott F. Johnson, Reexamining Rowley: A New Focus in Special Education Law, 2003 BYU EDUC. &
L.J. 561, 564 (2003).
41
Aron, supra note 39, at 7; see also Andrea Blau, The IDEIA and the Right to an “Appropriate”
Education, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 11 (2007) (“State, district, and circuit courts, subsequent to Rowley,
have attempted to define ‘appropriate’ education with little consistency or uniformity.”).
32
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benefit to be meaningful, five require the benefit to merely be adequate or provide some
benefit, and one uses a combination of both.42 Thus, “[t]his definitional difference has
led to divergent results for students in different parts of the country.”43
¶12
Several commentators and federal courts have also questioned the precedential
value of Rowley’s educational benefit standard in light of the latest amendments to the
Act.44 Although none of the subsequent amendments have altered the definition of
FAPE,45 critics point to significant changes in the language of the Act that call into
question the continued validity of the Rowley standard. First, the stated intent of the Act
is no longer just to ensure educational access.46 This change of purpose was a reaction, in
large part, to findings suggesting that although disabled children were able to access
public education after the implementation of the EACHA, public education was not as
effective as it could be.47 To reflect these shortcomings, Congress amended the purpose
of the Act “to ensure the effectiveness of [] efforts to educate children with disabilities.”48
Furthermore, the statute details “our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity,
full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with
disabilities.”49 These changes in the purposes of the Act suggest that Rowley’s FAPE
definition “set[s] the bar too low.”50
¶13
In addition to shifting the IDEA’s purpose from ensuring educational access to
improving educational outcomes, the 1997 amendments changed the substantive and
procedural requirements for a student’s IEP in accordance with the newly stated
purpose.51 Moreover, the 2004 amendments that linked special education law with No
Child Left Behind further changed requirements to hold teachers and schools more
accountable.52
42

Aron, supra note 39, at 7.
Id. at 6 n.39 (commenting that states are free to “raise the floor” on their own if they so choose). See also
Philip T.K. Daniel & Jill Meinhardt, Valuing the Education of Students with Disabilities: Has Government
Legislation Caused a Reinterpretation of Free Appropriate Public Education?, 222 EDUC. L. REP. 515,
522–25 (2007) (arguing that the increase in educational standards among many states require “more than
just a basic floor of opportunity or some educational benefit as was required under Rowley”).
44
See generally J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., No. CO6-494P, 2006 WL 3628033 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8,
2006), rev’d on other grounds, No. C06-494P, 2007 WL 505450 (W.D. Wash. Feb 10, 2007); Eyer, supra
note 28; Johnson, supra note 40; Andrea Valentino, Note, The Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act: Changing What Constitutes An “Appropriate” Education, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 139 (2007).
45
Eyer, supra note 28, at 630.
46
The report by the House Committee shortly before passing the bill states that “[t]his committee believes
that the critical issue now is to place greater emphasis on improving student performance and ensuring that
children with disabilities receive a quality education. . . . This review and authorization of the IDEA is
needed to move to the next step of providing special education and related services to children with
disabilities: to improve and increase their educational achievement.” H.R. REP. NO. 105-95, 83–84 (1997),
as reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 80–81 (emphasis added).
47
In particular, Congress was concerned with the fact that a “significant number” of special education
students were failing courses and dropping out of school. Eyer, supra note 28, at 628.
48
20 U.S.C. § 1401(d)(4) (1997).
49
20 U.S.C. § 1401(c)(1) (1997).
50
J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., No. C06-494P, 2006 WL 3628033, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2006),
rev’d on other grounds, No. C06-494P, 2007 WL 505450 (W.D. Wash. Feb 10, 2007).
51
The 1997 amendment added several requirements for the inclusion of specific determinations in a child’s
IEP. It also required that disabled students be included in a school’s overall assessment tests and that
students must be mainstreamed as much as their disability allows. See Eyer supra note 28, at 631–33;
Johnson, supra note 40, at 578–80.
52
See Weber, supra note 28, at 16–21.
43
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Despite the constant criticism, the Rowley standard is still good law. A further
complication to this problem is that Rowley dealt with a challenge to the appropriateness
of a student’s IEP and not to a school district’s actual implementation of a student’s IEP.
As discussed in the next section, several district and circuit courts have extended
Rowley’s logic and holding to such instances.
C. The Many Standards Used to Evaluate a School District’s Failure to Implement a
Student’s IEP

¶15

The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the appropriate standard for
evaluating whether a school district’s failure to implement a provision of a student’s IEP
violates the student’s right to FAPE.53 At the circuit level, there is a growing trend
towards requiring that the failure to implement be a substantive failure before it is
cognizable, meaning that the nature of the failure is evaluated in relation to the student’s
IEP and the district’s implementation.54 In evaluating implementation failures, courts
have used any combination of the following methods: requiring the failure to involve a
“substantial,” “significant,” or “essential” provision of the student’s IEP; examining the
reason for the failure; examining whether the student received an educational benefit
despite a failure; and requiring the failure to be more than de minimis.55 As these
different methods suggest, the interpretation of whether a school district met the FAPE
requirements in implementing a student’s IEP has not been consistent at the district and
circuit court levels.56 Before examining how the substantive failure requirement has
percolated through the courts, it is necessary to examine the case that first established a
substantive failure standard.
1. Bobby R.: Significant Provision Standard57

¶16

In 2000, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the case of Houston
Independent School District v. Bobby R.58 In this case, the parents of a learning-disabled
student sued the Houston School District for failing to abide by the agreed-upon IEP.59
Specifically, the parents alleged that the school had not provided their son with speech
therapy and certain accommodations (such as highlighted texts, modified tests, and taped
lectures), and had failed to place him into a phonics program.60 Despite the fact that the
school district admitted that it did not meet these requirements of the IEP, the Fifth
Circuit found that the district’s failure to implement his IEP did not deprive the student of
53

Cf. Manalansan v. Bd. of Educ. of Balt. City, No. Civ. AMD 01-312, 2001 WL 939699, at *11 (D. Md.
Aug. 14, 2001) (“The majority of IDEA case law addresses the appropriateness of an IEP rather than the
failure of implementation.”).
54
See infra notes 58–123 and accompanying text.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
For the sake of brevity, this Note will refer to the standard as the “significant provision standard.” The
Bobby R. court also used the word “substantial” and the court in Neosho R-V School District v. Clark, 315
F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2003), used the word “essential,” but these appear to simply be synonyms and do not
alter the analysis.
58
200 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2000).
59
Id. at 344.
60
Id.
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the right to FAPE because “the significant provisions of [the student’s] IEP were
followed, and, as a result, [the student] received an educational benefit.”61
¶17
The main issue in Bobby R. was whether the school district satisfied Rowley’s twoprong test for providing FAPE. First, the court quickly dispensed with the procedural
requirements of the Act, as the student did not allege a procedural violation, and moved
to the substantive prong (whether the IEP was reasonably calculated).62 Although this
requirement only speaks to whether the IEP is reasonably calculated to provide some
educational benefit, the court, without acknowledging this distinction, applied this prong
to the IEP’s implementation.63 In justifying this extension, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily
on Rowley’s statement that a school district should have some flexibility in creating and
implementing the content of an IEP.64 Additionally, the court borrowed both language
and logic from a 1989 case out of the Southern District of Ohio to find that a school
district’s failure to implement “an IEP does not constitute a per se violation of the
IDEA.”65 The court then stated its new standard for evaluating IEP implementation
failures:
[W]e conclude that to prevail on a claim under the IDEA, a party
challenging the implementation of an IEP must show more than a de
minimis failure to implement all elements of that IEP, and, instead, must
demonstrate that the school board or other authorities failed to implement
substantial or significant provisions of the IEP.66
After announcing this new rule, the court did not engage in a discussion about whether
these three specific provisions were “significant;” it just stated that “the significant
provisions of [the student’s] IEP were followed, and as a result, he received an
educational benefit.”67 Interestingly, it is not apparent from the opinion whether the court
considered “substantial” to mean “many” provisions or whether the court considered
“substantial” to be synonymous with “significant.”68
61

Id. at 349.
Id. at 347.
63
Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 347–48 (5th Cir. 2000). In determining whether
the student’s IEP was reasonably calculated, the court looked to Cypress-Fairbanks Independent School
District v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 1997). Cypress-Fairbanks established four factors to
determine whether an IEP is reasonably calculated: “(1) the program is individualized on the basis of the
student’s assessment and performance; (2) the program is administered in the least restrictive environment;
(3) the services are provided in a coordinated and collaborative manner by the key ‘stakeholders’; and (4)
positive academic and non-academic benefits are demonstrated.” Id. at 253.
64
Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 348; see also Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist of Westchester
County v. Rowley, 458 US 176, 208 (1982) (“We previously have cautioned that courts lack the
‘specialized knowledge and experience’ necessary to resolve ‘persistent and difficult questions of
educational policy.’ [citations omitted]. . . . Therefore, once a court determines that the requirements of
the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States.”).
65
Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 349. The court borrowed this logic from Gillette v. Fairland Board of Education,
725 F. Supp. 343 (S.D. Ohio 1989), rev’d on other grounds, 932 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1991), noting that
Gillette held “that a local education agency’s failure to provide all the services and modifications outlined
in an IEP does not constitute a per se violation of the IDEA.”
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
The phrase “substantial portion” appears three times in the opinion, most notably when the court
analyzed the school district’s failure to provide a speech therapist to the student. See Houston Indep. Sch.
62
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¶18

In an attempt to provide some guidance as to what “significant” means, the court
stated in a footnote that “determination[s] of what are ‘significant’ provisions of an IEP
cannot be made from an exclusively ex ante perspective. Thus, a factor to consider under
an ex post analysis would be whether the IEP services that were provided actually
conferred an educational benefit.”69 The necessary implication of this guidance, as
discussed below, is that a provision is not significant if a student receives an educational
benefit despite the failure to implement.70 Using this logic, the court then found that
since the student had improved during the course of the year, he had received an
educational benefit and thus the school district did not violate his right to FAPE.71
¶19
Although the Bobby R. standard has been cited in most of the circuits (mostly at the
district level), few other circuit courts have analyzed the standard. The Eighth Circuit, in
Neosho R-V School District v. Clark, for example, discussed Bobby R. in the context of a
“reasonably calculated” claim for a school district’s failure to provide a behavior plan.72
While the court in Clark used the familiar Rowley rule to find that the district violated the
student’s right to FAPE by not providing a “reasonably calculated” IEP due to a lack of
an appropriate behavior plan,73 the court indicated in dicta that it thought “the analysis . .
. in Bobby R. more accurately suit[ed] the posture of th[e] case.”74 However, in applying
the Rowley standard, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that “we cannot conclude that an IEP is
reasonably calculated to provide a free appropriate public education if there is evidence
that the school district actually failed to implement an essential element of the IEP that
was necessary for the student to receive an educational benefit.”75 Just like the Bobby R.
court, the Clark court did not provide analysis as to why this provision was “essential” to
the student’s IEP.76 It is important, however, to distinguish Clark from Bobby R. by
noting that the two cases have fundamentally different analytical frameworks. Bobby R.
attempted to delineate between “significant” and “insignificant” IEP provisions in terms
of an educational benefit, while Clark interpreted Rowley’s “reasonably calculated”
prong as only applying to “essential” provisions of IEPs.77
¶20
Many district courts have interpreted Bobby R.’s standard literally; they apply the
significant requirement to the specific provision of the student’s IEP in question. Thus,
the term “significant” applies not to the type of failure, but rather to how important the
provision was to the student’s IEP, and whether the provision was required for the
student to receive an educational benefit. For example, in J.P. ex rel. Peterson v. County
Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 348 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he [district] court opined that the ‘most
significant failing’ in this area involved the fact that for substantial portions of the 1994–95 academic year
a speech therapist was not available.”) (emphasis added). However, just a few sentences later, the court
then found that “significant provisions” of the student’s IEP were followed. Id. at 349.
69
Id. at 349 n.2.
70
But see infra notes 92 and 216 and accompanying text.
71
Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 350.
72
315 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003).
73
Id. at 1028.
74
Id. at 1027 n.3.
75
Id. (emphasis added).
76
A possible explanation for why the court found that the district’s failure to implement the behavior plan
might be that the student was autistic, and thus the behavior plan could be instrumental in the student’s
educational development.
77
Despite this distinction, many courts find Clark to be synonymous with Bobby R. See, e.g., B.F. v.
Fulton County Sch. Dist., No. 04 Civ. 3379, 2008 WL 4224802, at *25 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 9, 2008); Catalan ex
rel. E.C. v. District of Columbia, 478 F. Supp. 2d 73, 75 (D.D.C. 2007).
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School Board of Hanover County, a district court evaluated the student’s claim that the
district failed to implement provisions of his IEP.78 The court dismissed the school
district’s failure to implement an “Oral Motor Skills Assessment,” reasoning that the
assessment “would have minimal impact on improving his speech and language” and thus
the district’s delay in assessing the autistic student was not “material.”79 However, the
court held that the district violated the FAPE requirements by not implementing a
“discrete trial method,” because such a method “is central to the ABA instructional
method” and thus, a significant provision of the IEP.80 Other courts have applied similar
logic in many specific instances, including evaluating the significance of a student’s
behavioral plan in relation to other provisions,81 the significance of a classroom aide,82
and the significance of providing Extra School Year (ESY) services during the summer.83
Thus these courts followed the Bobby R. standard strictly as they weighed the relative
importance of the challenged provision to the entire IEP.84
¶21
Other district courts have interpreted Bobby R.’s standard to require analyzing
whether the student received an educational benefit despite a school district’s failure to
implement.85 This standard is similar to a “significant provision” analysis, but requires
examination of whether the student received an educational benefit instead of whether the
specific provision was “significant.”86 One example of such an “educational benefit”
analysis is in the case of Leighty v. Laurel School District.87 The school district was
alleged to have failed to implement a learning-disabled student’s IEP by not placing
“specific emphasis on the skill-related goals contained in her IEP.”88 The district court
78
447 F. Supp. 2d 553 (E.D. Va. 2006), rev’d on other grounds, J.P. ex rel. Peterson v. County Sch. Bd. of
Hanover County, 516 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2008).
79
Id. at 569.
80
Id. at 570–72. The court reasoned that this was essential to the success of the IEP because the student
had success using this method at a different school and returned to the current school “on the condition that
[the district] make efforts to emulate the methods used [at the previous school.]” The court went further to
state that “if discrete trials had been implemented for each, or at least most, of [his] goals, the discrete trial
technique could certainly have been a substantial and significant component of [his] IEP.” Id. at 571.
81
See Mr. C. v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 6, No. 06-198-P-H, 2007 WL 4206166, at *24–25 (D. Me.
Nov. 28, 2007) (holding that the student’s behavioral plan was in “a position of preeminence, making clear
that other IEP objectives were to yield if need be”).
82
See Slama ex rel. Slama v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2580, 259 F. Supp. 2d 880, 888–89 (D. Minn. 2003)
(finding that a provision providing a specific personal care attendant was not significant because other
attendants were “available to render services of similar quality”); Manalansan v. Bd. of Educ. of Balt. City,
No. Civ. AMD 01-312, 2001 WL 939699, at *11 (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2001) (holding that a school district
violated FAPE for failing to provide classroom aides because “[t]he aide provides assistance for all class
room [sic] activities and makes it possible for [the student] to be maintained in the general education
setting”).
83
S.S. ex rel. Shank v. Howard Road Academy, Civ. No. 08-214, 2008 WL 4891391, at *10 (D.D.C. Nov.
12, 2008) (reasoning that because the student’s IEP team noted the student had a “critical need” for ESY
services over the summer due to “prior ‘serious regression,’” the school’s failure to provide such services
was a material failure to implement his IEP).
84
See also Marc V. ex rel. Eugene V. v. North East Indep. Sch. Dist., 455 F. Supp. 2d. 577, 595–96 (W.D.
Tex. 2006) (finding that the school district implemented the student’s IEP by providing a trained, qualified,
and certified teacher and aide).
85
Evaluating a student’s educational benefit depends upon which standard the specific court uses in
evaluating the educational benefit. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
86
Such analysis makes sense given the fact that the Bobby R. court did not engage in a discussion as to why
the certain IEP provisions were significant. See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text.
87
457 F. Supp. 2d. 546 (W.D. Pa. 2006).
88
Id. at 555.
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held that the school district did not violate her right to FAPE because the student’s
special education teacher testified that she made “meaningful” progress and “remarkable
improvement,” and an assessment showed “mixed progress.”89 Several other courts have
employed similar logic.90 Thus, under the educational benefit standard, it is possible that
a school district could not implement a “significant” element, yet still not violate the
IDEA if the student were to receive some/any educational benefit.
¶22
However, this methodology has been criticized by at least two courts.91 As one
district court explained:
Such a holding would seem to reflect a belief that the IDEA serves a
deterrent function and creates substantive rights that can be enforced even
if a child has been lucky enough to make progress despite a school
district’s failure to comply with federal law. In other words, when it is
clear that the statute has been violated, a school should not be released
from liability because a child has made some educational progress.92
This criticism of focusing on the student’s educational benefit is discussed more
thoroughly below.93
¶23
Although Bobby R. is generally cited for almost all IEP implementation
challenges,94 not all courts have strictly interpreted Bobby R. in the same manner as the
J.P. and Leighty courts. One of the ways other courts have interpreted the Bobby R.
standard is to examine not how significant the provision was to the student’s IEP, but
instead how significant the failure was on behalf of the school district.

89

Id.
See Burke v. Amherst Sch. Dist., No. 08 Civ. 0140SM, 2008 WL 5382270, *11–12 (D.N.H Dec. 18,
2008) (“[H]ere, as in Bobby R. [citations omitted], the record demonstrates academic achievement . . . [and
thus,] the District’s failure to implement the videotaping objective did not deprive [the student] of a
FAPE.”); Wanham v. Everett Pub. Sch., 550 F. Supp. 2d. (D. Mass. 2008) (holding the Independent
Hearing Officer did not err in “requiring [the student] to show harm where services listed in the IEP were
not delivered”); Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist. v. J.K., 400 F. Supp. 2d. 991, 996 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding
that the district did not violate FAPE despite the student’s regression in toilet training because the district
did provide the student with “some benefit”); Falzett v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 152 F. App’x. 117,
120 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that “substantial evidence exists in the record to support the finding that [the
school] provided [the student] with meaningful educational benefit despite some failures”); Gillette v.
Fairland Bd. of Educ., 725 F. Supp. 343, 347 (S.D. Ohio 1989), rev’d on other grounds, 932 F.2d 551 (6th
Cir. 1991) (holding that the school provided the student with FAPE despite the fact that “portions of the
IEP were not followed” because the student was “able to achieve satisfactory grades and to advance [grade
levels]”).
91
See Manalansan v. Bd. of Educ. of Balt. City, No. Civ. AMD 01-312, 2001 WL 939699, at *14 (D. Md.
Aug. 14, 2001); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 281 v. Minn. Dept. of Educ., No. A06-1617, 2007 WL 2774337, *8
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2007) (“But if a district fails to implement the IEP, it is irrelevant whether the
student made educational progress despite the district's failure to comply with the IDEA.”).
92
Manalansan, 2001 WL 939699, at *14.
93
See infra notes 215–220 and accompanying text.
94
See Catalan ex rel. E.C. v. District of Columbia, 478 F. Supp. 2d 73, 74 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[T]he consensus
approach to (failure to implement cases) among federal courts that have addressed it has been to adopt a
standard articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Houston Independent School District v. Bobby R.”).
90
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2. Melissa S.: Shifting The Focus Away From the IEP Provision to the School District’s
Failure
¶24

In Melissa S. v. School District of Pittsburgh, the Third Circuit applied the Bobby
R. standard in a slightly different manner to a case in which the parents of a student with
Down’s Syndrome challenged the implementation of her IEP.95 In Melissa S., the parents
of the student alleged that the school district failed to provide an educational aide
everyday, assign homework daily, and implement a behavioral plan.96 Though the Third
Circuit cited the Bobby R. significant provision standard with approval,97 the court
deviated from that standard by examining the school’s reason for failing to provide the
educational aide. Here the court found that although the school did not provide an aide
everyday (due to the aide leaving the position), the school complied with the student’s
IEP because the district either utilized a substitute teacher or just notified the student’s
parents that an aide could not be provided and told them to keep the student home for the
day.98 Thus, the court implied that the district’s excuse for failing to provide an aide was
in good faith or at least reasonable, and therefore did not violate the student’s right to
FAPE.99 This shift represents a slight, but significant change to Bobby R.—the Third
Circuit focused on the reason for the failure instead of how significant the provision was
to the student.
¶25
Other courts also seem to focus on the reason for the school district’s failure to
implement a student’s IEP instead of a provision’s “significance.” Take, for example,
Catalan ex rel. E.C. v. District of Columbia.100 At issue in Catalan was the school
district’s failure to provide the student with the agreed-upon speech therapy.101 In finding
that such a failure was not “material,” the court specifically stated that “the failure to
follow the IEP’s requirements to the letter was excusable under the circumstances.”102
Such circumstances included the speech therapist missing a few sessions, cutting other
sessions short because the student’s fatigue made the therapy unproductive, and missing
sessions altogether due to snow days, school holidays, and the student’s absences.103
Thus, while “[t]echnically, the IEP was violated . . . these failures were not substantial
enough to constitute a FAPE deprivation.”104
95

183 F. App’x. 184, 186 (3d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 187.
97
Id. (“To prevail on a claim that a school district failed to implement an IEP, a plaintiff must show that the
school failed to implement substantial or significant provisions of the IEP, as opposed to mere de minimis
failure, such that the disabled child was denied a meaningful benefit.”). The court did not explicitly state
that there was a good faith exception, however, it did so implicitly in its application.
98
Id. The court found that because the student was never left alone, the district met its obligations to
provide a full-time aide.
99
Id. The court also used the traditional Bobby R. standard to find that the district’s possible failure to give
homework everyday was de minimis and that the district had implemented a behavioral plan. Id. at 188–
89.
100
478 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.D.C. 2007).
101
Id. at 75.
102
Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
103
Id.
104
Id.; see also Sarah Z. v. Menlo Park City Sch. Dist., No. 06 Civ. 4098, 2007 WL 1574569, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. May 30, 2007) (affirming the ALJ’s decision for the school district despite a fourteen-day gap in
services caused when the school district chose to not renew the provider of the student’s services because
the small time-frame and because the student was being “closely monitored” during this gap); Bd. of Educ.
of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Michael R., No. 02 Civ. 6098, 2005 WL 2008919, at *12 (N.D. Ill.
96
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This shift is grounded in the idea that courts should not examine the educational
significance of a particular IEP provision, but should instead examine “whether the
deviations from the IEP’s stated requirements were ‘material.’”105 As the Catalan court
recently explained:
[T]he Fifth Circuit’s language [in Bobby R.] easily could be misread as
contemplating an abstract inquiry into the significance of various
“provisions” . . . of the IEP, rather than a contextual inquiry into the
materiality (in terms of impact on the child’s education) of the failures to
meet the IEP’s requirements. This is a subtle distinction, but, in this
court’s view, an important one. Very few, if any, “provisions” of an IEP
will be insignificant or insubstantial, and the Bobby R. standard should not
be read to allow educators to distinguish in the abstract between important
and unimportant IEP requirements. To the contrary, all the requirements
in an IEP are significant, and educators should strive to satisfy them. It is
in the contextual, ex post analysis—i.e., whether the requirements are
feasible and in the best interest of the child as she progresses—that
questions of substantiality and significance arise.106

This standard, therefore, essentially shifts “significant” as a modifier of the provision of
the student’s IEP to a modifier of the nature of the failure and to the reason behind that
failure. By doing this, these courts have allowed school districts to essentially present a
good faith excuse.
¶27
One court that strictly interpreted the Bobby R. standard explicitly rejected the
notion of a good faith excuse for IEP implementations. In Manalansan v. Board of
Education of Baltimore City, a district court stated that a “‘good faith effort’ will not
meet the statutory and regulatory command.”107 It reasoned that the Department of
Education promulgated federal regulations that required school districts to “[m]ake a
good faith effort to assist the student to achieve the goals and objectives or benchmarks
listed in the IEP” did not apply to IEP implementation challenges because the “goals and
objectives” were different from actual implementation.108 By focusing on the purpose of
the regulation, it found that the good faith provision protects schools by not penalizing
them when students do not meet all of their objectives because “[e]ven the best educator
with all the services available cannot guarantee that a child will meet all objectives set
out in an IEP.”109 In contrast, according to the court, a good faith effort defense should
Aug. 15, 2005) (refusing to find a district liable for failing to implement a behavior plan because “the root
of the problem in implementing the plan was not the staff, but the complexity of [the student]’s plan and
the difficulties of carrying it out in a large, regular education high school”).
105
Catalan ex rel. E.C. v. District of Columbia, 478 F. Supp. 2d 73, 75 (D.D.C. 2007).
106
Id. at 76 (internal citations omitted).
107
No. Civ. AMD 01-312, 2001 WL 939699, at *13 (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2001).
108
Id. at *14; 34 C.F.R § 300.350 (emphasis in original). This “accountability” regulation has since been
removed by the Department of Education because the “good faith” requirement was “unnecessary because
other Federal laws, such as title 1 of the ESEA, already provide sufficient motivation for agency effort to
assist children with disabilities in making academic progress.” Assistance to States for the Education of
Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46540, 46753
(Aug. 14, 2006) (removing 34 C.F.R. § 300.350 effective Oct. 14, 2006).
109
Manalansan, 2001 WL 939699, at *12.
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not apply when a school district fails to implement services in a student’s IEP, as
implementation of these services is within the control of the school district and not
subject to a student’s ability to satisfy all objectives in an IEP.110 Thus, providing
services “in accordance with [an] IEP is mandatory, not discretionary.”111
¶28
Melissa S. and other similar cases applied a slightly different analysis in the failure
to implement issue, as they focused not on how significant a particular provision was to
the student’s IEP, but instead on the reason for the failure to implement. To further
complicate things, as further elaborated below, other courts have taken the de minimis
language from Bobby R. in situations where the failure was so minor or trivial that it did
not adversely affect a student’s educational performance.
3. More than de minimis Standard
¶29

The more than de minimis standard arises out of language in Bobby R. in which the
Fifth Circuit stated that “a party challenging the implementation of an IEP must show
more than a de minimis failure to implement all elements of that IEP.”112 Black’s Law
Dictionary defines a de minimis failure as something that is “trifling,” “minimal,” or “so
insignificant that a court may overlook it in deciding an issue or case.”113 The Bobby R.
court used this standard to find that the student’s failure to improve in specific language
skills “was de minimis . . . [as] it is not necessary for [the student] to improve in every
area to obtain an educational benefit from his IEP.”114
¶30
In an effort to define failures that are not de minimis, the recent case of Damian J.
v. School District of Philadelphia115 proves to be quite instructive. One of the issues in
Damian J. was the school district’s failure to implement many different portions of the
student’s IEP due to his teachers’ lack of qualifications and training.116 Here, his
“emotional support classroom teacher” was not “highly qualified” as required by the Act
because she was neither licensed nor certified as a special education teacher.117 His
teacher also did not receive any training on how to implement his IEP.118 This
fundamental failure led to many implementation gaps, including not tracking his progress
towards his IEP’s goals and objectives,119 never meeting with the student’s mother, and
even continuing to “use” an old IEP after a newer one was written.120 In finding that the
student was denied FAPE due to a failure to implement his IEP, the court drew from the
110

Id.
Id.; see also D.D. ex rel. V.D. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 465 F.3d 503, 512 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he
IDEA does not simply require substantial compliance on the part of the participating states; it requires
compliance.”).
112
Houston Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2000).
113
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 197 (3d Pocket ed. 2006).
114
Bobby R., 200 F.3d. at 350.
115
See Civ. No. 06-3866, 2008 WL 191176 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2008).
116
Id. at *3–5.
117
Id. at *3.
118
Id. at *3–4.
119
As an example of how poorly his teacher was in implementing his IEP, his teacher acknowledged that
while “she knew she had to write a daily journal on Damian, she viewed this as unfair as it was not done for
the other children.” Id. at *4.
120
Damian J. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., Civ. No. 06-3866, 2008 WL 191176, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2008).
The court even found that after the student’s teacher was fired, her replacement did not do much better. Id.
at *4–5.
111
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testimony of an independent specialist who stated that “it is frustrating and demoralizing
to see almost complete failure to implement even the simpler components of the plan.”121
¶31
Thus, this standard is probably best used in terms of better narrowing the
significant provision test that Bobby R. first prescribed; de minimis failures occur when a
school fails to implement insignificant provisions of an IEP, which does not cause a loss
of appropriate educational benefits.122
4. Combination of Standards
¶32

Finally, several courts have used a combination of standards, applying different
tests to different provisions of an IEP. This means courts will look at whether the failure
was de minimis, whether the provision was significant, and whether the school district
had a reasonable excuse for the alleged failure.123 It should also be noted that cases
examining the qualifications of school personnel, while technically not “failure to
implement” cases, do seem to address IEP implementation. In such cases, courts have
found that failing to provide a qualified teacher, aide, or other personnel violates Section
504 regulations,124 and furthermore may be evidence of an inappropriate placement, thus
making the child eligible for compensatory relief.125 For example, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed a compensatory education award when a school district did not provide the
student with a properly licensed occupational therapist.126 While the court in Evanston
Community Consolidated School District Number 65 v. Michael M. neither undertook a
121

Id. at *5.
See also Melissa S. v. Sch. Dist. of Pittsburg, 183 F. App’x. 184, 188 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the
alleged failure to instruct the student in math at her grade level and to give her homework were de
minimis); Fisher ex rel. T.C. v. Stafford Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 05-2020, 2007 WL 674304, at *12 (D.N.J.
Feb. 28, 2007) (holding that a school district’s failure to provide a trained aide when the normal aide was
not available was “at most, [a] de minimis failure to fully implement”); Clear Creek Ind. Sch. Dist. v. J.K,
400 F. Supp. 2d 991, 997 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that inconsistent locations for in-home trainings were
de minimis because “there [was] no evidence that the varying locations of the training affected [the
student’s learning] at all”); Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Michael R., No. 02 Civ. 6098,
2005 WL 2008919, at *12–20 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2005) (holding that the district’s several failures to
implement among other things a behavior plan, speech and physical therapy services, and using a properly
fitting weighted vest did not violate the student’s right to FAPE because these failures were de minimis).
The case of Sarah Z. v. Menlo Park School District, No. Civ. 06-4098, 2007 WL 1574569, at *7–9 (N.D.
Cal. May 20, 2007) could also be analyzed as a de minimis case as the court found two “harmless errors,”
but the court did not use the term and instead cited to Van Duyn’s materiality standard instead. But see
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 281 v. Minn. Dept. of Educ., No. A06-1617, 2007 WL 2774337, at *9 (Minn. Ct.
App. Sept. 25, 2007) (finding the de miminis exception does not apply to the Department of Education’s
“authority under the IDEA”).
123
See Melissa S., 183 F. App’x. at 184; Falzett v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 152 F. App’x. 117, 120 (3d
Cir. 2005); Clear Creek, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 991; Michael R., 2005 WL 2008919, at *14; Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 281, 2007 WL 2774337, at *9; Ross v. Framingham Sch. Comm., 44 F. Supp. 2d 104, 116–28 (D.Mass
1999); Gillette v. Fairland Bd. of Educ., 725 F. Supp. 343, 346-48 (S.D. Ohio 1989), rev’d on other
grounds, 932 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1991). Despite being decided prior to Bobby R. it is important to note that
Gillette and Ross also fall into this category. Furthermore, Ross first articulated “guidelines” to use when
evaluating a district’s failure to implement, stating that districts do not violate FAPE when the: “(1) Failure
to implement must not be complete, (2) Variance from special education and related services specified by
the IEP must not deprive the student of FAPE, (3) Provision of special education and related services must
make progress toward the achievement of the goals stated in the IEP.” Ross, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 119.
124
MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE § 19: 2–3 (LRP Publ’n 3d. ed.
2008) (collecting cases).
125
Id. at § 19:7–8.
126
Evanston Comm. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 65 v. Michael M., 356 F.3d 798, 802–03 (7th Cir. 2004).
122
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“failure to implement” analysis nor cited to any of the above cases, it did appear to
implicitly reject one of Bobby R.’s central tenets as it affirmed compensatory relief in the
face of a lack of evidence that the occupational therapist “did not do a good job.”127
Thus, the court affirmed a substantive “technical violation,” as opposed to a procedural
violation, 128 without regard to the effect of this failure as to the child’s educational
benefit.
5. Van Duyn: Only Material Failures Violate the IDEA
¶33

Just recently, in Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker School District 5J, the Ninth
Circuit became the latest circuit court to throw its hat into the proverbial substantive
failure ring, adding a slightly different standard for evaluating failure to implement cases.
The divided court cited the Bobby R. standard with approval and held that only material
failures to implement an IEP constitute a deprivation of FAPE.129 This case is important
not only because it expands the substantive failure requirement to another circuit, but also
because the dissenting judge articulates reasons for why this growing standard might not
be a good idea.
III. VAN DUYN EX REL. VAN DUYN V. BAKER SCHOOL DISTRICT 5J
A. Facts and Procedural History

¶34

Christopher Van Duyn is a severely autistic boy who received special education
and related services at his local public school.130 Prior to completing elementary school,
the school’s IEP team, comprised of teachers, district representatives, and his mother,
agreed to an IEP that would be used the following year (2001–02 school year).131 Some
of the IEP’s provisions included: work on language arts for six to seven hours a week,
math for eight to ten hours a week, and “adaptive P.E.” for three to four hours a week; a
behavior management plan; placement in a “self-contained classroom” and presentation
of work at his level; access to a regional autism specialist who would visit the school
twice a week; “augmentative communication” services for two hours per month; an
educational aide who has received state autism training; quarterly report cards to measure
his progress; and about seventy short-term objectives for the year.132 Christopher’s
performance during the following year was mixed; his reading scores “deteriorated,” but
his behavior and math skills improved.133
¶35
Just a few weeks into the 2001–02 school year, Christopher’s parents filed a
request for a due process hearing.134 His parents alleged that the school district did not
127

Id. at 801.
Id. at 803.
129
Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2007).
130
Id. at 815. It is important to note that Christopher’s eligibility for special education and related services
was not in dispute.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 815–16.
133
Id. at 816.
134
Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2007). Section 1415(f)
provides for an “[i]mpartial due process hearing” when a student (usually through his or her parents)
alleges a deprivation of FAPE and describes the procedural and substantive requirements of the hearing.
128
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implement Christopher’s IEP and that this failure to implement constituted a deprivation
of FAPE.135 Specifically, they complained that the school district failed to train his
teachers and aides, he was not placed in a self-contained classroom, did not receive oneon-one instruction, the district did not implement the behavioral plan, and the district
failed to provide specific daily instruction in oral language, reading, and math skills.136
¶36
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that the school district failed to
implement his IEP with respect to his math education because Christopher only received
half of the hours stated in his IEP, but that the district did implement the other
provisions.137 As a remedy, the ALJ ordered that the district comply with the IEP’s
requirement of “8–10” hours of math instruction per week.138 On appeal, the district
court affirmed the ALJ’s decision.139 In so finding, the court stated that “perfection [in
terms of implementation] cannot be the standard” and held that although not all of the
agreed-upon provisions were met, outside of the math instruction, none of the other
failures constituted a “substantial or significant” failure to implement Christopher’s IEP
under the Bobby R. standard.140 Additionally, the district court clarified the ALJ’s order
regarding the math instruction, finding that the district was required to provide an
additional five hours of math instruction a week, but that this was not a compensatory
remedy.141 This is significant, as a compensatory remedy would require the school
district to “make up” its failure by providing extra services in addition to its regular
obligations.142 However, because the ALJ’s order was not compensatory, the school
district was only required to provide the eight to ten hours of math instruction already
required by the IEP without providing additional math instruction to make up for the
deficit. The parents appealed to the Ninth Circuit, seeking to reverse the district court’s
decision.
B. Ninth Circuit Majority Opinion
¶37

On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Van Duyns alleged that the district’s failure to
implement Christopher’s IEP satisfied neither the procedural nor substantive prongs of
the Rowley two-prong test.143 Regarding the procedural violation, the Van Duyns did not
allege a violation of a “traditional” procedural requirement under Section 1415 since they
135

Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 814.
Id. at 816–17. For a more detailed description of the facts and allegations, see Van Duyn ex rel. Van
Duyn v. Baker School District, 2005 WL 50130, at *3–7 (D. Or. Jan. 11, 2005).
137
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 817.
138
Id.
139
Van Duyn, 2005 WL 50130, at *20-21.
140
Id. at *3, *20.
141
Id. at *20. Christopher’s parents argued that the ALJ’s order for the extra math instruction was
compensatory (“to make up for the math lost time”), but the district successfully argued that the ALJ only
held that the “district was required to provide additional math instruction on a going-forward basis.” Id.
Additionally, the District Court also rejected a claim for attorney’s fees under Section 1515(i)(3)(B)(i)
because it found that “taken as a whole, [the] plaintiff did not obtain relief on a significant claim in a
manner that caused a material alternation in his legal relationship with the defendant.” Id. Thus, the
District Court rejected the awarding of attorney’s fees despite the fact that the Court awarded a remedy for
the plaintiff. Although the discussion of attorney’s fees is outside the scope of this Note, it is briefly
mentioned at infra note 187.
142
See Walker v. District of Columbia, 157 F. Supp. 2d 11, 30 (D.D.C. 2001) (“Where a school system
fails to provide special education or related services, a student is entitled to compensatory education.”).
143
Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 818–19 (9th Cir. 2007).
136
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had approved the IEP. Instead, they argued that by not implementing portions of
Christopher’s IEP, the district had changed his IEP without notice to or consent of his
parents.144 Furthermore, his parents argued that the school district’s action prevented
their participation in the decision-making process around their son’s IEP.145 The court
rejected these arguments because it did not read the district’s failure to implement
specific portions of the IEP as the district “changing” the IEP.146 The court reasoned that
there was “no evidence in the record that the District ever attempted to change his IEP
after the 2001–02 school year began.”147 Furthermore, the court rejected the notion that
when a district fails to implement a portion of an IEP, it changes the IEP and thus creates
a procedural violation because “there is no indication that a conflation of this sort is
intended or permitted by the statute.”148 Thus, the court strictly interpreted IDEA’s
procedural safeguards, finding that since there were no “official” revisions of
Christopher’s IEP, the district did not violate the Act’s procedural requirements.149
¶38
After addressing the Van Duyns’ procedural argument, the court then addressed
their substantive argument. First, the Van Duyns argued that the burden of proof during
the administrative hearing should have been placed on the school district.150 Based on
the recent Supreme Court decision of Schaffer v. Weast,151 the Ninth Circuit rejected this
contention, finding that the Van Duyns, as the party seeking relief, bore the burden of
proof.152 The Van Duyns argued that Schaffer did not apply because it dealt with a
challenge to an IEP’s content and not to its implementation, but the Ninth Circuit rejected
this too, commenting that “[n]othing in Schaffer hinged on the kind of challenge being
made to the IEP. . . . [Thus n]either Schaffer nor the text of the IDEA supports imposing a
different burden in IEP implementation cases than formulation cases.”153 Second, the
144

Id. at 819. Section 1415(b)(3) requires that “written prior notice to the parents of the child [must occur]
before (A) propos[ing] to initiate or change; or (B) refus[ing] to initiate or change, the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to
the child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3).
145
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 819. Section 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)(II) allows “a hearing officer [to] find that a child
did not receive a free appropriate public education only if the procedural inadequacies . . . significantly
impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision making process regarding the provision of a
free appropriate public education to the parents’ child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(ii)(II).
146
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 819.
147
Id.
148
Id. The court also rejected a claim by Christopher’s parents that Manalansan v. Board of Education of
Baltimore City applies, stating that “[l]ike all other courts to have considered the relationship between the
IEP implementation failures and IDEA procedural violations, Manalansan understood the tardiness and
absences of the plaintiff’s aides as failure to implement the IEP, not surreptitious attempts to alter it.” Id.
149
This argument is important as it implicates educational policy and a school district’s motives for
avoiding legal challenges to the implementation of an IEP. This is because parents who are satisfied with
an IEP’s content are probably less likely to challenge a school district’s implementation of that IEP.
Therefore, a school district might have an incentive to promise more than it intends to provide, betting that
the parents might not challenge the IEP’s implementation (assuming of course the parents learns of the
failure). Thanks to Professor Mark Weber for this insight.
150
Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2007).
151
545 U.S. 49, 62 (2005) (“[T]he burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is
properly placed upon the party seeking relief.”).
152
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 820.
153
Id. Many commentators have called upon Congress to amend the IDEA in order to undo the Schaffer
decision, but Congress has yet to do so. See generally Luke Hertenstein, Note, Assigning the Burden of
Proof in Due Process Hearings: Schaffer v. Weast and The Need to Amend The Individuals with
Disabilities in Education Act, 74 UMKCC L. REV. 1043 (2006); Kevin Pendergast, Comment, Schaffer’s
Reminder: IDEA Needs Another Improvement, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 875 (2006); Jordan L. Wilson,
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Van Duyns also argued that the IEP should be treated as a contract and thus should be
analyzed under breach-of-contract analysis, but the court rejected this argument.154
¶39
Third, and most importantly, the Van Duyns alleged that the district’s failure to
implement Christopher’s IEP deprived him of FAPE.155 Because the standard of
evaluating an IEP’s implementation was a matter of first impression in this circuit, the
court analyzed the IDEA and relevant case law to articulate a new standard before
deciding whether the district violated the IDEA.
¶40
Beginning with the IDEA, the court found that “[t]here is no statutory requirement
of perfect adherence to the IEP, nor any reason rooted in the statutory text to view minor
implementation failures as denials of a free appropriate public education.”156 Although
the court concluded that a party may claim injury due to a district’s failure to implement
an IEP under Section 1415(f), it limited this claim by stating that the Act “counsels
against making minor implementation failures actionable.”157 It supported this statement
with a citation to Section 1401(9), which defines FAPE as “special education and related
services that . . . are provided in conformity with the [student’s] individualized education
program.”158 Thus, the court concluded the “in conformity” clause of Section 1401(9)
limits the scope of challenges available under Section 1415(f) to more than just minor
implementation failures, because the word “conformity” does not imply an exact
requirement.159
¶41
After finding no textual support for a “perfect adherence” standard in the IDEA, the
court then examined whether the relevant case law supported such reasoning. Like many
other courts,160 the majority first turned to Rowley’s interpretation of FAPE. In extending
Rowley logic to implementation challenges, the majority focused on two parts of the
Supreme Court’s opinion. First, the majority reasoned that since Rowley found that
minor procedural flaws are not per se violations of FAPE, it therefore logically follows
that minor substantive flaws in implementation of an IEP are also not per se violations of
FAPE.161 Second, the majority drew from Rowley’s overall policy discussion regarding a
Note, Missing the Big IDEA: The Supreme Court Loses Sight of the Policy Behind The Individuals With
Disabilities Education Act in Schaffer v. Weast, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 161 (2007). But see Jennifer M. Burns,
Note, Schaffer v. Weast: Why the Complaining Party Should Bear the Burden of Proof in an
Administrative Hearing to Determine the Validity of an IEP under IDEA, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 569 (2006).
154
Specifically, the Van Duyns argued that the IEP should be treated as a contract and thus the ambiguities
in the IEP that led to the district’s failure to implement should be “resolved in [his] favor because the
document was drafted by the district for his benefit.” Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 820. The court rejected this
argument, finding that since IEPs are a statutorily created right, IEP claims cannot proceed under breachof-contract analysis. Id. Furthermore, the court stated in dicta that even if contract law did govern this
claim, that it would not make a difference because Christopher’s parents “played a central role” in creating
his IEP and that the contract really was not that ambiguous. Id.
155
Id. at 819.
156
Id. at 821.
157
Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2007). The court
reasoned that a party may “challenge an IEP . . . ‘on substantive grounds based on a determination of
whether the child received a free appropriate public education.’” Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i)).
158
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (emphasis added).
159
See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
160
See Julie F. Mead & Mark A. Paige, Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson v. Rowley: An
Examination of Its Precedential Impact, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 329, 334 (2008) (“[T]he two-part test articulated
by the Rowley Court has become the guiding framework when determining whether the services
contemplated by an IEP have delivered FAPE.”).
161
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 821; see also Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 207 (1982).
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school district’s flexibility and expertise in providing special education and related
services and concluded that a “perfect adherence” standard would conflict with a school
district’s flexibility in the creation and implementation of a student’s IEP.162
¶42
Finally, the majority then looked to Bobby R. and Clark for additional support for
its reading of Rowley and the text of the IDEA.163 After discussing both Bobby R. and
Clark, the majority concluded that only “a material failure to implement an IEP violates
the IDEA.”164 A material failure, according to the court, “occurs when there is more than
a minor discrepancy between the services a school provides to a disabled child and the
services required by the child’s IEP.”165 (It should be noted that this is a slightly different
definition from an earlier version of the Ninth Circuit’s decision as the earlier version
included both the minor discrepancy language as well as stated that “[a] material failure
occurs when the services a school provides to a disabled child fall significantly short of
the services required by the child’s IEP.”166) Most importantly, and as discussed below,
the court significantly limited the material failure standard: “[W]e clarify that the
materiality standard does not require that the child suffer demonstrable educational harm
in order to prevail. However, the child's educational progress, or lack of it, may be
probative of whether there has been more than a minor shortfall in the services
provided.”167
¶43
In applying the material failure standard, the court held that only the school
district’s failure to provide sufficient math instruction violated Christopher’s right to
FAPE.168 In so holding, the majority did not provide any reason why this was a material
failure other than noting that the ALJ had found that this was a failure.169 After
addressing the math claim, the court then found that none of the other allegations rose to
the “material failure” standard.170
¶44
The majority applied its new materiality standard to the four main claims advanced
by the Van Duyns (failure to provide math instruction, failure to implement the behavior
plan, whether the work was on his level, and whether he was placed in a self-contained
classroom) and to seven secondary claims.171 Below are the majority’s conclusions for
all of the alleged implementation failures:

162

Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 821–22. Neither the court nor the appellate briefs cite to Melissa S. v. School District of
Pittsburgh, 183 F. App’x. 184 (3d Cir. 2006). This is perhaps due to the fact that Melissa S. is a nonprecedential case published only in the Federal Appendix.
164
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 822 (emphasis added).
165
Id.
166
See Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 481 F.3d 770, 781 (2007), amended by Van
Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811 (2007) (emphasis added).
167
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 822 (emphasis added).
168
Id. at 823.
169
See id.
170
See infra notes 171–183.
171
Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 823–25, 823 n.5 (2007). The court
did not use the terminology “main” or “secondary” claims, but they are organized in this fashion as the
court discussed the four “major” claims in detail in the text, and discussed the other “secondary” claims
very briefly in a footnote.
163
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Findings on Major Claims
(1) The school district’s failure to provide eight to ten hours of math instruction
per week was a material failure because Christopher only received five hours
a week.172
(2) The district’s failure to implement his behavioral plan in the same manner
that his middle school did was not a material failure because the IEP did not
say it had to be identical, the school did use many of the behavioral
techniques in the plan, and evidence suggested that the elementary school
behavior plan was inappropriate for the middle school.173
(3) Since there was “ambiguity in the record about whether . . . work was
presented at [Christopher]’s level,” the court could not conclude that the
district materially failed to present work at his level.174
(4) The district did not materially fail to provide him with a self-contained
classroom because his IEP did not require a single classroom of just “highly
disabled students receiv[ing] instruction individually or in small groups . . . [,
allowing] complete flexibility as to the timing and content of instruction.”175
Even if his IEP did require this, the district provided a self-contained
classroom as his class-sizes varied from seven to fifteen, he always had one
teacher and one aide assigned specifically to him, and because the instruction
was flexible enough to allow breaks and individual instruction when
necessary.176
Findings on Secondary Claims
(1) The district did not materially fail to provide daily reading and writing
because he had language arts on certain days of the week and had “relevant”
classes on the other days of the week.177
172

Id. at 823.
Id. at 823–24. The Van Duyns claimed that the plan was not implemented because (1) the middle
school did not use daily behavior cards as strictly as the elementary school; (2) a social worker wasn’t
employed in one of his classrooms and was used “improperly” by two others; (3) Christopher was not told
to go to his “quiet room” after misbehaving; and (4) Christopher’s “quiet room” was not adequately
equipped. Id. at 824. The majority concluded that the IEP did not explicitly say that the middle school’s
implementation had to be identical to the elementary school’s implementation; it was also not implicit
because his IEP did not “clearly describe” how the elements in his elementary school behavior plan were
either used in elementary school or how they were to be used in middle school. Id.
174
Id. at 824. The ambiguity existed because his aide testified, “what [Christopher] would learn about on
any given day depended on what the [rest of the] class was taught that day.” Id. In contrast, Christopher’s
two main teachers testified that his instruction was one-on-one and “was never subjected to lecture-style
teaching.” Id. Additionally, this is one area where the court noted his educational progress, stating that
“there is no evidence that his educational progress was hindered as a result of exposure to materials that
were too advanced for him.” Id.
175
Id.
176
Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 824–25 (2007). The majority
distinguishes this situation from Ash v. Lake Oswego School District No. 7J, 766 F. Supp 852 (D. Or.
1991), a case cited by the Van Duyns.
177
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 823 n.5. The district alternated student schedules in blocks, thus on “red” days
he had gym, language arts/reading, math, and study skills; on “white” days he had social studies/language
arts, computers/vocational, language arts, and reading. Id. at 815.
173
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(2) Despite not working towards all of his short-term objectives, the district did
not materially fail “given the extremely large number of objectives.”178
(3) There was no material failure regarding his augmentative communication
services because his IEP only required these services two hours a month.
Furthermore, the IEP did not require these services to be provided only by
regional staff.179
(4) Despite the regional autism consultant’s failure to visit twice a week as stated
in the IEP, this was not a material failure because the regional autism
consultant made “frequent visits” as did other autism consultants.180
(5) The district provided Christopher with “approximately” the required time for
gym and swimming, thus the district did not materially fail to implement
these provisions of his IEP.181
(6) Christopher’s report cards “largely resembled the elementary school report
cards used previously and tracked many of the IEP’s goals and short term
objectives.”182
(7) His aide’s failure to be trained at the state level was not a material failure
because she attended autism classes elsewhere and had met with “people
knowledgeable about [Christopher]’s experience with the condition.”183
¶45

In conclusion, the majority held that only the district’s failure to provide adequate
math instruction constituted a deprivation of FAPE.184 Although the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s holding that the school district did not have to provide
compensatory instruction, and thus the school district’s “corrective actions” met the IEP’s
requirements,185 it partially reversed the district court’s refusal to grant attorney’s fees.
The Ninth Circuit found that a party challenging an implementation of an IEP could
recover attorney’s fees, despite not being awarded compensatory education, if a party
“prevail[s] on the issue’s merits and obtain[s] a remedy . . . that materially alter[s] his
178

Id. at 823 n.5.
Id.
180
Id. According to Christopher’s parents, the IEP required “26 regional consultations” within a 3-month
period, but the autism consultant only visited 14 times. Brief of Petitioner-Appellants at *21, Van Duyn ex
rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. CV-02-01060). Relying on the
district court’s conclusion that (1) Christopher’s parents did not explain why the IEP required twice-a-week
visits from a regional consultant instead of just an autism consultant from the district and that (2) the
difference between “regional” and “district” consultation in this case was one merely of title not substance,
the court found that there was not a material failure. Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 823 n.5. See also Van Duyn ex
rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist., 2005 WL 50130, at *13 (D. Or. Jan. 11, 2005).
181
Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 823 n.5 (2007). The ALJ found that
the IEP did not specifically require gymnastics and swimming. “Instead the IEP required three or four
hours per week of ‘adaptive PE.’ Gymnastics, along with swimming, were listed in the IEP as ‘related
services.’” Van Duyn, 2005 WL 50130, at *13 (D. Or. Jan. 11, 2005). Thus, these services were just a few
among many activities that could be used. Id. The lower court did note, however, that “even if the IEP
required a certain amount of weekly time spent in gymnastics class, it would be difficult on this record to
find any failure to provide such classes material” because “the parents do not show that a failure to
participate in gymnastics cost plaintiff material vestibular benefits which he did not obtain from
swimming.” Id. This analysis by the lower court seems to use the educational benefit standard.
182
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 823 n.5.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 825.
185
The school district accommodated the extra hours by increasing Christopher’s math instruction to three
days a week and required him to work on math during “advisory time.” Id. at 823.
179
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legal relationship with the District.”186 Despite prevailing on the merits (math
instruction) and obtaining a remedy (corrective actions by the school district), the court
refused to grant attorney’s fees because “attorney’s fees should not be granted to parent
attorneys who represent their children in IDEA proceedings.”187
C. Judge Ferguson’s Dissenting Opinion
¶46

In his dissent, Judge Ferguson sounded several judicial and policy concerns as he
criticized the majority’s materiality standard. First, Judge Ferguson viewed a failure to
comply with a student’s IEP as a per se deprivation of FAPE.188 Judge Ferguson argued
that the “in conformity with” language in the Act and the use of the phrase “in
accordance with the child’s IEP” in the Federal Regulations leaves no room for the courts
to evaluate the substantive quality of a district’s failure to fully implement an IEP.189
¶47
Among the several reasons for this view, Judge Ferguson argued that it would be
inappropriate for the judiciary to determine what constitutes a material failure.190 He
reasoned that since IEP teams are experts in the area of special education, once the
content of an IEP is agreed upon by all required parties, judges are not in a position to
substantively evaluate the contents of an IEP.191 Additionally, he argued that school
districts could use this materiality rule to intentionally change certain parts of a student’s
IEP without meeting the Act’s procedural requirements just by ignoring what it deems
“non-material.”192 Finally, he argued that the materiality standard is too vague,
especially in light of the fact that “most IEPs contain . . . quantitative requirements.”193
IV. EVALUATING VAN DUYN EX REL. VAN DUYN V. BAKER SCHOOL DISTRICT 5J
¶48

In determining whether the Van Duyn court came to the correct legal decision, it is
necessary to examine the majority’s application, textual analysis, and its precedential
analysis. It is also relevant to apply the other standards discussed above to show the
implications of the new standard and how the decision has affected this new body of law.

186

Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 826 (2007). Thus, the court rejected
the school district’s argument that “because the ALJ ordered only the provision of services already required
by the IEP, there was no change in the parties’ existing legal relationship.” The court went further, stating
that “[w]ere the District’s argument accepted, it would mean that a plaintiff in an implementation failure
suit could win attorney’s fees only if he was awarded not only the remedies mandated by his IEP, but also
compensatory education (or other relief) not called for his IEP.” Id.
187
Id. Currently, four Circuits do not permit the recovery of attorney’s fees for parents who represent their
children. See Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2006); S.N. ex rel. J.N. v.
Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2006); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248
F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2001); Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 260 (4th Cir.1998). Whether or not this is a correct
interpretation of the IDEA is outside the scope of this Note.
188
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 827 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (“A school district’s failure to comply with the
specific measures in an IEP to which it has assented is, by definition, a denial of FAPE, and, hence, a
violation of the IDEA.”).
189
Id. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (9); 34 C.F.R. § 300.323(c)(2).
190
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 828.
191
Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 828 (2007).
192
Id.
193
Id.
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A. Application of the New Materiality Standard
¶49

Several patterns emerge in the application of the new standard. First, two of the
four major claims addressed not whether the district failed to implement agreed-upon
content, but instead whether the IEP even required the district to provide those
services.194 Thus, the analysis of these claims was more like analysis in typical IDEA
claims, dealing with content of an IEP and not implementation. This is an interesting
twist to the case, as the majority spent significant time detailing the new materiality
standard, yet at the same time did not apply it across the board. This perhaps indicates
the materiality standard—as evidenced by the court’s application and the lack of
voluminous discussion regarding implementation standards generally throughout federal
courts—only applies in very limited situations.
¶50
Second, the majority used the materiality standard not in the Bobby R. or Clark
manner, but more in the de minimis or “more than a minor discrepancy” manner for
several of his claims.195 Thus despite citing to the Bobby R. and Clark standard for its
rule, the court did not apply the standard from those cases. By never discussing whether
any of the provisions were essential to Christopher’s IEP, the majority implicitly rejected
Bobby R., despite citing it with approval.
¶51
Third, the court only discussed Christopher’s educational performance twice. The
main instance was in discussing the behavioral plan, when the court used the fact that
Christopher’s behavior improved to show that the elementary school’s behavioral plan
“was inappropriate for the middle school context.”196 The only other mention of his
educational benefit was when the court discussed the level of work claim.197 Here the
court refused to find an implementation failure due to conflicting evidence, but did note
that there was no evidence that his “educational progress was hindered as a result of
exposure to materials that were too advanced for him.”198
¶52
Fourth, the court seemed to briefly use a good faith/excusable behavior standard for
his aide’s failure to be trained at the state level, for the district’s failure to not work
toward all of his short-term objectives, and for the autism consultant’s failure to meet
with him twice a week.199

194

For example, the court held that the district did not have to provide an identical behavior plan, supra
note 173 and accompanying text, and found that the IEP did not require a self-contained placement, supra
note 175 and accompanying text. Additionally, the court also conducted a content analysis with the
augmentative communication skills program, supra note 179 and accompanying text.
195
The provisions that the court found to be “not material,” in such a manner that it analyzed whether the
failure “was more than a minor discrepancy,” included the self-contained classroom issue, his reading and
writing, the short-term objectives, the autism consultant, gym/swimming classes, report cards, and his
aide’s training. Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 824, 823 n.5.
196
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 824.
197
Id. at 823 n.5.
198
Id. at 824.
199
Id. at 823 n.5. The court excused the aide’s failure to be trained at the state level because she was
trained in other ways and had sought out assistance of others. Id. Regarding the failure to work toward all
of the short-term objectives, the court excused the district’s failure due to the “extremely large number of
objectives.” Id. Finally, the court excused the failure of the autism expert to visit the school twice a week
because she and other autism consultants “frequently visit[ed]” the school. Id.
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B. The New Materiality Standard is Legally Sound

¶53

The majority’s new materiality standard is legally sound, but its analysis of the
Act’s requirements and applicable caselaw is deficient and could have been much
stronger. First, the majority’s textual analysis is incomplete. The court is correct in
noting that the Act provides for a wide range of challenges. The Act affords a party the
right to challenge the lack of an IEP, the content of a proposed IEP, the procedures used
to create, maintain, and alter an IEP, and a district’s failure to implement provisions of an
IEP.200 However, the court did not provide any textual or secondary support for why the
“in conformity with” clause should limit implementation challenges. Even the Bobby R.,
Clark, and Melissa S. courts did not follow this textual analysis.201 One commentator
argues that the “in conformity with” clause of Section 1401(9)(D) “does not suggest
flexibility . . . but rather its definition connotes strict compliance.”202 Such criticism is
valid given that the court failed to analyze how others have defined “in conformity with.”
To surmount this criticism, the court’s textual argument would have been stronger had it
defined the word “conformity.” For example, several dictionaries define “conformity” as
“similarity” and “likeness.”203 These words do not imply “exact” or “perfect” adherence.
¶54
Second, the majority’s precedential analysis is incomplete. The majority
substantially relies on Rowley’s characterization that the IDEA’s purpose is to establish a
“basic floor of opportunity” and not to require “potential-maximizing education.”204
However, this controversial proclamation is the subject of constant scrutiny.205
Furthermore, the court applied Rowley’s “appropriate education” holding to the context
of IEP implementation challenges, despite the fact that Rowley, as the majority
acknowledged, dealt “with a challenge to an IEP’s content,” not its implementation.206
The court’s logic seems slightly contradictory, as it looked to Rowley’s substantive
“appropriate education” holding for extension into implementation cases through a
flexibility to school districts argument, but at the same time relied on Rowley’s
procedural holding.207 A clearer explanation of this extension is needed. One way to
200

See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415.
See Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2003); Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby
R., 200 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2000); Melissa S. v. Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 183 F. App’x. 184 (3d Cir. 2006).
Furthermore, neither of Bobby R.’s predecessors used this analysis either. See Gillette v. Fairland Bd. of
Educ., 725 F. Supp. 343 (S.D. Ohio 1989), rev’d on other grounds, 932 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1991); Ross v.
Framingham Sch. Comm., 44 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1999).
202
Elexis Reed, Note, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act—The Ninth Circuit Determines That
Only A Material Failure to Implement an Individualized Education Program Violates the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 61 SMU L. REV. 495, 499 (2008).
203
For example, an Oxford Dictionary from around the time when the bill was passed defined “conformity”
as “[c]orrespondence in form or manner; agreement in character, likeness; congruity.” THE SHORTER
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES (C.T. Onions ed., Oxford at the Clarendon
Press 3d ed. 1973). A 1995 Oxford defines “conformity” as only “to make similar.” CONCISE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH (R.E. Allen ed. 1995).
204
Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 821 (2007) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of
Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 197 n.21, 201 (1982)).
205
See, e.g., J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., No. CO6-494P, 2006 WL 3628033, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec.
8, 2006), rev’d on other grounds, No. C06-494P, 2007 WL 505450 (W.D. Wash. Feb 10, 2007); see also
supra notes 44–52 and accompanying text.
206
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 821.
207
Id. (“This suggests that minor failures in implementing an IEP, just like minor failures in following the
IDEA's procedural requirements, should not automatically be treated as violations of the statute.”).
201
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possibly solidify this extension depends upon how one views Rowley and implementation
challenges. If Rowley is seen as requiring rigid enforcement of the IDEA’s procedural
requirements, but yet setting low substantive requirements, perhaps this extension can be
justified. Put another way, if Rowley’s procedural requirements are harder to satisfy than
its substantive requirements, once a court determines procedural requirements are met,
then the Act’s substantive requirements cannot be held to such a rigorous standard. This
appears to be the Van Duyn court’s view, as it evaluated the implementation challenge
within Rowley’s substantive prong instead of within Rowley’s procedural prong.
However, if a court views implementation challenges as violations of the IDEA’s
procedural requirements, especially those going to parental participation, then such an
extension might not be warranted. Clarification is needed here that is beyond the scope
of this Note. Congress should evaluate the trend of courts’ extensions of Rowley’s fairly
low standard for IEP content into areas not directly related to the appropriateness of an
IEP, such as implementation challenges, eligibility determination, and least restrictive
environment cases.208
¶55
The majority also ignores the fact that the Ninth Circuit (along with five other
circuits) uses the “meaningful” educational benefit standard and not just Rowley’s “some
educational benefit.”209 Although the majority’s conclusion that school districts should
be “grant[ed] some flexibility . . . with implementing IEPs” is not substantiated with a
complete legal discussion, it appears to be the correct conclusion due simply to the fact
that Rowley still remains good law.210
¶56
In addition to not fully discussing the Rowley standard, the majority also failed to
completely connect the dots between other courts’ substantive failure standards and the
newly announced materiality standard. There is no discussion as to why the majority
chose not to fully adopt the standard used in Bobby R. and subsequently in Clark.
Although the courts in Bobby R. and Clark required a failure to be “substantial,”
“significant,” or “essential,” the Van Duyn court required only a material failure. This is
a subtle, but important difference. According to the court, a material failure “occurs
when there is more than a minor discrepancy between the services a school provides to a
disabled child and the services required by the child’s IEP.”211 This new standard does
not require analysis of the importance of the provision within the IEP; in fact, it appears
in definition and in practice like a more rigorous de minimis standard.212 Further, the
court specifically states that “the materiality standard does not require that the child
suffer demonstrable educational harm in order to prevail.”213 Therefore, this standard
208

See Mark C. Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 154 (2009) (“[T]he reach of
Rowley should be limited to its definition-of-appropriate-education context . . . .”); id. at 157 (“[Courts]
need to recognize that its some-benefit standard does not govern questions such as which services are
needed for a child to be educated in the least restrictive environment.”).
209
Aron, supra note 39, at 7 n.40.
210
This is bolstered by the fact that the Supreme Court has consistently cited Rowley with approval, most
recently in Winkelman ex. rel. Winkelman v. Parma City School District, 550 U.S. 516, 525 (2007).
211
Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 822 (2007) (emphasis added).
212
Another example of a more rigorous de minimis standard appears to have been applied in one of the
cases applying Van Duyn’s material failure standard. See Termine v. William S. Hart Union High Sch.
Dist., 249 F. App’x 583, 586 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding a denial of FAPE, for among other things, a material
failure to implement a student’s existing IEP when the school proposed an interim placement for the
student in general education thirty-two percent of the time, despite the fact the student’s IEP provided that
the student spend no time in general education).
213
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 822.
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rejects the educational improvement standard used by other courts, including the court
that Bobby R. cited for its standard.214 Also, the case discussion left out mention of
standards employed by other courts, like Melissa S., that examine the reason for the
school district’s failure. Thus, despite the growing body of law addressing standards
used to evaluate a district’s failure to implement an IEP, the Van Duyn court cited only to
Bobby R. and Clark while omitting other court decisions and, more importantly, other
standards.
C. The New Materiality Standard is an Important Shift in Legal Policy
¶57

The new materiality standard used by the Van Duyn court is an important legal
development as it strikes a better balance between deference to educational authorities
and maintaining protections for students with disabilities. The most significant legal shift
is the majority’s explicit limiting language regarding examining the student’s educational
benefit. The Van Duyn court specifically rejected the extension of Bobby R. that other
courts have found,215 stating that “we would disagree with Bobby R. if it meant to suggest
that an educational benefit in one IEP area can offset an implementation failure in
another.”216 The Bobby R. court spent considerable time discussing the fact that the
student still received an educational benefit despite the failure to implement the student’s
speech therapy.217 The rejection of the educational benefit standard is correct, especially
since courts have awarded compensatory education for both procedural218 and substantive
violations219 without regard to the student’s educational performance. By not requiring
“that the child suffer demonstrable educational harm in order to prevail,” the materiality
standard shifts the focus away from assessing a student’s educational performance and
towards the nature of the failure itself.220
¶58
In addition to this important limitation on the materiality standard, by not fully
adopting the Bobby R. standard, the Van Duyn court adopted a linguistically similar yet,
substantively different standard that is more appropriate for judges to use. Judge
Ferguson’s warnings that “[j]udges are not in a position to determine which parts of an
214

See Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 348–49 (5th Cir. 2000) (adopting “[t]he
approach taken” in Gillette. v. Fairland Bd. of Educ., 725 F. Supp. 343 (S.D. Ohio 1989), rev’d on other
grounds, 932 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1991)).
215
See supra notes 78–90.
216
Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 823 n.3 (2007).
217
See Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 349–50 (commenting on the fact that the student’s “test scores and grade
levels in math, written language, passage comprehension, calculation, applied problems, dictation, writing,
word identification, broad reading, basis reading cluster and proofing improved during his years [at the
school]”).
218
See Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that “Congress did
not intend that a school system could discharge its duty under the [Act] by providing a program that
produces some minimal academic advancement” despite failing to meet the Act’s procedural requirements).
219
See, e.g., Evanston Comm. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 65 v. Michael M., 356 F.3d 798, 802–03 (7th Cir.
2004).
220
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 822. Such guidance appears to have been lost in one recent case applying Van
Duyn, Bobby R., and Clark. See Burke v. Amherst Sch. Dist., Civ. No. 08-014-SM, 2008 WL 5382270, at
*11 (D.N.H. Dec. 18, 2008) (“[H]ere, as in Bobby R., the record demonstrates academic achievement [in
spite of a failure to implement]. Across the eight areas of focus in her IEP, [the student] achieved or made
satisfactory progress towards more than sixty-five objectives, and made at least some progress toward
nearly eighty-five of them. Thus, like the court in Bobby R., . . . [the student] received an educational
benefit from [her] IEP.”) (internal citations omitted).
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agreed-upon IEP are or are not material” mischaracterizes the materiality standard. Such
a reading focuses on the materiality of specific provisions of a student’s IEP (like the
Bobby R. standard) instead of whether the discrepancy between what was agreed-upon in
the IEP and what was actually provided was material.221 Quite the opposite, the
materiality standard protects the judiciary by only allowing judges to focus on how
significant a failure was or if the failure was justified, instead of focusing on the
significance of a particular provision of an IEP. Although the court did not explicitly
reject the Bobby R. standard like the District Court of Columbia in Catalan v. District of
Columbia, its application implicitly rejected it.222 Thus, it is advantageous for courts not
to decide how important a provision is to a student’s IEP, as courts are not well versed in
educational policy and the creation of IEPs.223
¶59
Finally, the materiality standard was used to extend Schaffer to implementation
challenges.224 The court clearly states that “the party objecting to [an] IEP’s
implementation [bears] the burden of proof at the administrative hearing.”225 Although
this might seem inconsistent with the IDEA and unfair due to the nature of the challenge,
unless Congress amends the Act to change the burden or unless state legislatures require
placing the burden on school districts, the law appears to be settled.226 Thus, students
(and their representatives) have the burden of showing that the failure to implement was
“more than a minor discrepancy.”227 The use of the materiality standard appears to calm
fears about placing the burden of proof on the student because, as discussed above,
proving harm or a lack of harm to a student’s educational performance is not mandatory.
¶60
Although the materiality standard repudiates Bobby R.’s significant provision test
and represents an advancement in legal policy, it raises several questions that will need to
be answered as the standard is applied. One area that the case does not sufficiently
address and thus leaves open to debate is whether a court can find a technical violation of
an IEP, find that it was not material, but yet order some type of relief?228 How does the
material failure standard for implementation failures interact with procedural failures?229
221

Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 827 (2007) (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
This perception by Judge Ferguson is probably warranted because the majority’s opinion is not as clear as it
could have been; the majority relies on Bobby R., but does not apply the new rule in the same manner as the
Bobby R. rule.
222
See Catalan ex rel. E.C. v. District of Columbia, 478 F. Supp. 2d 73, 76 (D.D.C. 2007) discussed supra
note 105, 106. More important than rejecting the Bobby R. standard, the court in Catalan evaluated the
claim’s materiality based on a good faith/reasonable excuse standard. Thus, the Catalan court held that the
school district was excused in not providing the required amount of therapy because the therapist missed
just a “handful of sessions,” the therapist had to cut sessions short due to the child’s fatigue, and snow days,
holidays, and the child’s absences from school prevented some of the sessions. Id. at 76.
223
It is hard to imagine what the outcome of this case would have been had the court contemplated whether
certain provisions of Christopher’s IEP were significant (outside of his math instruction). It could perhaps
be argued that his behavior plan was significant because he is autistic; however, the court decided this issue
by merely interpreting the requirements of the IEP, instead of considering the failure to implement. The
same could be said about the self-contained classroom allegation. See supra notes 173 and 175 and
accompanying text.
224
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 820.
225
Id.
226
Weber, supra note 28, at 40 n.195.
227
Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 822 (2007).
228
Perhaps the court in these cases could enter nominal damages on behalf of the student.
229
See S.B. ex rel. Dilip B. v. Pomona Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 06-4874 AHM (RCx), 2008 WL
1766953, at *11–12 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2008) (refusing to apply Van Duyn’s material failure standard to
the school district’s failure to ensure that a regular education teacher attend the student’s IEP meeting); see
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Or with other non-IDEA claims such as state disability rights statutes, the Americans
with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and claims under the
Constitution?230 Furthermore, should material failures to implement require granting the
same type of compensatory relief usually received in procedural and content-based
challenges?231 Interestingly, the caselaw cited above regarding the trend in the federal
courts to require a substantive failure almost exclusively deals with students seeking
compensatory and/or reimbursement relief. This, then, presents the possibility that
students could avoid the substantive failure standard by just filing for injunctive relief in
an effort to force school districts to strictly comply with the written IEP. Of course,
doing so would not compensate the students from past failures. Also, attorney’s fees
under the IDEA are awarded to the “prevailing party,” but what does “prevailing” mean
in an implementation context?232 Does prevailing only apply to material failures?
Finally, in light of the court’s extension of Schaffer’s burden of proof holding, should
implementation challenges that focus on the school’s failure instead of the significance of
an IEP provision fit within this category?233 These questions are not within the scope of
this Note and thus will be left for some other commentator or court to answer.
D. The Materiality Standard Benefits Students and Schools
¶61

In addition to being good for the judiciary, the new materiality standard is also
good for schools and children with disabilities. First, the materiality standard still
preserves a school district’s significant flexibility and leeway in implementing a student’s
IEP. Additionally, it allows school districts to focus on the bigger picture and not spend
considerable time and resources on ensuring the full implementation of every provision
of a student’s IEP. Finally, having the flexibility provides school districts with some
also Adam J. ex rel. Robert J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 804, 812 n.24 (5th Cir. 2003) (refusing
to apply Bobby R. to procedural violations).
230
See, e.g., Couture v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Public Sch., 535 F.3d 1243, 1251–53 (10th Cir. 2008)
(noting some possible tension between implementing an IEP and the Fourth Amendment: “If we do not
allow teachers to rely on a plan specifically approved by the student’s parents and which they are statutorily
required to follow, we will put teachers in an impossible position-exposed to litigation no matter what they
do.”); Wiles ex rel. Bond v. Dept. of Educ., Civ. Nos. 04-00442 ACK-BMK, 05-00247 ACK-BMK, 2008
WL 5331138, at *3 n.4 (D. Haw. Dec. 18, 2008) (“If failures to implement services in an IEP are not
automatically considered violations of the IDEA, it follows that similar failures would not give rise to per
se liability under Section 504.”).
231
The court stated clearly that it would not order compensatory education; instead, it merely required the
district to begin complying with the math sections of Christopher’s IEP per the ALJ’s order. Van Duyn,
502 F.3d at 823.
232
20 U.S.C. §1415(1)(B)(1). Here, the court stated that attorney’s fees for the issue of failing to
implement his math instruction would have been awarded despite no order for compensatory education as
they were the “prevailing party” had the Van Duyn’s hired a third-party to represent them. Van Duyn ex
rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 825 (2007).
233
See generally Hertenstein, supra note 153, at 1052–56. Herstenstein breaks the burden of proof
discussion into three phases: Initial Evaluation, Initial IEP Development, and IEP Review and
Modification. During evaluation, he argues that the party opposing evaluation should bear the burden of
proof as to why the “evaluation is obviously unnecessary.” During the development of the IEP, he argues
that “the school should bear the burden of proof in the . . . due process hearing [challenging the creation of
the IEP], regardless of which party initiated the hearing.” Finally, he argues that Shaffer’s holding should
apply only to when a party seeks to modify an IEP “over the objections of the other party.” Thus, the
burden of proof in these cases lies with “the party asking for change” as this “reflects the IDEA’s strong
preference both for consensus for the status quo, and protects the child from unnecessary changes unless
there are convincing reasons to modify the IEP.” Id.
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incentive to provide as many services as possible.234 Conversely, if a district is legally
responsible to provide all provisions of an IEP, then a district conceivably does not have
an incentive to write in as many objectives as possible.
¶62
Second, the materiality standard should prevent school districts from intentionally
disregarding certain portions of an IEP in an attempt to alter it without going through the
required procedures. This is good for students because it requires districts to meet the
agreed-upon provisions and holds them accountable if they do not. Furthermore, the
materiality standard is a dramatic improvement from Bobby R.’s standard, in that students
no longer have to prove that a provision was significant; all they have to do now is show
that the failure was significant. Finally, the court allowed the recovery of attorney’s fees
for material failures, despite the fact that the remedy ordered was not compensatory in
nature. Although this standard might appear to only favor school districts, the protections
that it affords children are better than Bobby R. and are reasonable in light of the current
educational benefit standard under Rowley.
V. CONCLUSION
¶63

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Van Duyn represents a significant and important
departure from earlier decisions that required a substantive failure standard in IEP
implementation cases. It is unfortunate that the court did not expressly reject the Bobby
R. standard; instead, the court implicitly rejected it by developing a subtly different rule
and application. Nonetheless, it is an important rejection as the newly created materiality
standard benefits all parties involved; courts, schools, and students with disabilities stand
to gain from the use of the materiality standard. The decision stands on relatively firm
legal ground and is a good standard in light of its legal and educational implications.

234

But see Reed, supra note 202, at 499 (“Allowing the flexibility that the Supreme Court [in Rowley] and
the Ninth Circuit [in Van Duyn] suggest regarding IEP content and implementation only undermines the
very reason Congress created the IDEA—the educational needs of millions of children with disabilities
were not being fully met.”).
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